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WHAT WERE LORD WESTBURY’S INTENTIONS IN PHILLIPS V PHILLIPS? BONA 
FIDE PURCHASE OF AN EQUITABLE INTEREST 
ADAM REILLY* 
 
ABSTRACT. In Phillips v Phillips, Lord Westbury stated that, against a bona fide 
purchaser faced with an ‘equity’ to rescind, “the Court will not interfere”. This 
has been interpreted to mean that purchasers of even an equitable interest shall 
take free of prior equities. Yet the distinction between ‘equities’ and equitable 
interests has been, and remains, uncertain; some have therefore questioned the 
intent behind Phillips. This paper shall elucidate Lord Westbury’s intentions within 
their historical context and argues that Phillips offers a coherent, functional 
explanation of both: (i) the protection given to equity’s darling; and (ii) how that 
protection was effected. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The equitable defence of bona fide purchase for value without notice has been, and remains, a 
foundational rule of equity jurisprudence. As Lord Briggs recently observed of the doctrine: 
“Equity has a special fondness for bona fide purchasers for value without notice. That is why 
they are called equity's darlings”.1 The defence has traditionally served a foremost role in 
settling priority disputes between legal and equitable property rights in the conveyancing 
context,2 but has also demarcated the outermost limits of equitable intervention; for against 
equity’s darling, a court of equity does not exercise jurisdiction.3 The defence continues to play 
a similar role in equitable doctrine today,4 though within a much narrower compass. In a small 
and ever-diminishing corner of unregistered conveyancing in England and Wales, the defence 
still operates.5 However, it is really within the context of equitable proprietary remedies, such 
as the range of claims available following a breach of trust,6 or claims to rescind or rectify 
voidable transfers of title,7 that bona fide purchase retains an ongoing practical significance. 
 
* Lecturer in Private Law, University of Glasgow. Address for Correspondence: School of Law, 5–9 The Square, Stair 
Building, University of Glasgow, University Avenue, Glasgow, G12 8QQ. E-mail: adam.reilly@glasgow.ac.uk. I am grateful 
to James Lee and Norma Dawson for reading, and commenting upon, earlier drafts of this article. In addition, I benefitted a 
great deal from conversations on this topic with John Mee, Pauline Ridge and Darryn Jenson. I would also like to thank the 
anonymous reviewers whose comments greatly improved the final draft. All remaining errors are my own.  
1 Re Stanford International Bank Ltd [2019] UKPC 45, [2020] 1 B.C.L.C. 446, at [70]. 
2 Akers v Samba Financial Group [2017] UKSC 6, [2017] A.C. 424, at [62] Lord Neuberger. 
3 Wortley v Birkhead (1754) 28 E.R. 364, 366 (Ch.); D.E.C. Yale (ed.), Lord Nottingham’s Chancery Cases, vol. II, (London 
1961), 160. 
4 D. Fox, “Purchase for Value Without Notice” in P. Davies, S. Douglas and J. Goudkamp (eds.), Defences in Equity (Oxford 
2018), 54. 
5 S. Bridge, E. Cooke and M. Dixon, Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property, 9th ed., (London 2019), [5–006]. 
6 Fox, “Purchase for Value Without Notice”, 54. 
7 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch. 281, at [162]–[167]; A. Nair, Claims to Traceable Proceeds: Law, 
Equity and the Control of Assets (Oxford 2018), [7.28]. 
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We nowadays treat the acquisition of the legal estate as a necessary precondition to 
raising the defence.8 However, in 1861, Lord Westbury laid down the following rule in Phillips 
v Phillips: 
 
[W]here there are circumstances that give rise to an equity as distinguished from 
an equitable estate—as for example, an equity to set aside a deed for fraud, or to 
correct it for mistake—and the purchaser under the instrument maintains the plea 
of purchase for valuable consideration without notice, the Court will not interfere.9 
 
Though Lord Westbury did not explicitly say as much in the gobbet above, His Lordship has 
been subsequently interpreted as holding that, when faced by a prior ‘equity’, the bona fide 
purchaser of even an equitable interest may also plead the defence.10 Phillips therefore 
represents an exception to the otherwise general approach that disputes between successive 
equitable entitlements are resolved using the ‘first in time’ priority rule.11 Where both parties 
assert equitable rights, the reasoning in Phillips remains practically important in demarcating 
those disputes resolved by the bona fide purchase defence, from those resolved using the 
equitable priority rules.12 For this reason, the rule is not yet pure legal history but still belongs 
in practitioners’ texts. 
This paper concerns the proper interpretation of Phillips v Phillips. The decision has been 
insightfully analysed by Dominic O’Sullivan QC in a paper in which he argues that Lord 
Westbury has been widely, and consistently, misunderstood.13 In truth, Lord Westbury would 
not have resolved disputes between ‘equities’ and equitable interests by using the title-clearing 
defence.14 Rather, on Lord Westbury’s true view, disputes between ‘equities’ and equitable 
interests were always resolved using the ‘first in time’ priority rule.15 Such is clear, O’Sullivan 
argues, from Lord Westbury’s decision in Eyre v Burmester, delivered less than a year after 
Phillips, which saw a prior ‘equity’ to rescind come head-to-head against a subsequent 
equitable interest acquired by a bona fide purchaser.16 Despite this, Lord Westbury seemingly 
disregarded his statement in Phillips and applied the ‘first in time’ rule in favour of the prior, 
rescinding-claimant.17 Lawyers subsequently overlooked Eyre v Burmester with the net-result 
that a number of taxonomical problems attributable to the application of the rule in Phillips 
have arisen; namely, the confusion as to which entitlements are ‘mere equities’ and why.18     
Although O’Sullivan’s article is almost two decades old, it remains the most thorough, 
contemporary exegesis of the decision in Phillips within that decision’s historical context.19 
This paper seeks to revisit that context to argue against a key pillar of O’Sullivan’s thesis; 
namely, Lord Westbury’s true intentions behind the judgment in Phillips v Phillips.20 In truth, 
 
8 Bridge et al., Megarry & Wade, 9th ed., [5-009]; J. McGhee and S. Elliott (eds.), Snell’s Equity, 34th ed., (London 2019), 
[30–065]; L. Tucker, N. Le Poidevin and J. Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts, 20th ed., (London 2020), [44–121]. 
9 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1167 (Ch.). 
10 Ernest v Vivian (1864) 33 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 513, 519. 
11 Halifax Plc v Omar [2002] EWCA Civ 121, [2002] 2 P. & C.R. 26, at [68]. 
12 Ibid., at [68]. 
13 D. O’Sullivan, “The Rule in Phillips v Phillips” (2002) 118 L.Q.R. 296, 296–300. 
14 Ibid., at 309. 
15 Ibid., at 310. 
16 Ibid., at 311–15. 
17 Ibid., at 312–13. 
18 Ibid., at 314–16. 
19 Moreover, the last edition of his co-authored text on the law of rescission suggests that O’Sullivan still holds to the views 
set out in his L.Q.R. piece. A footnote cites the paper and comments, “[i]t is doubtful that later cases correctly understood Lord 
Westbury’s true opinion on this point”: D. O’Sullivan, S. Elliott and R. Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission, 2nd ed., (Oxford 
2014) at [21.69] n. 107. 
20 Given this narrow focus, this paper shall not engage with the full range of argument O’Sullivan makes against the rule in 
Phillips in his L.Q.R. piece, particularly his observations upon the competing explanations for the rule as a ‘defence’ of bona 
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Lord Westbury meant what he said in Phillips. Not only did O’Sullivan not accurately interpret 
Eyre v Burmester, but his paper also overlooked a subsequent dispute in the same litigation that 
puts Lord Westbury’s views beyond doubt.21   
The paper shall first elucidate the reasoning in Phillips within its historical context; we 
shall see that Lord Westbury undertook an extensive survey of bona fide purchase within the 
legal and procedural landscape of 1861 with the likely aim of addressing contemporary 
uncertainty surrounding the defence. O’Sullivan’s argument shall then be considered in light 
of the Eyre v Burmester litigation and rejected in sections three and four. A fifth section will 
then defend the rule in Phillips against that claim that the application of its ratio rests on an 
uncertain distinction between ‘equities’ and equitable interests.22 Lord Westbury only used this 
terminology to articulate a conceptual argument that bona fide purchase had a distinct function 
from that performed by the equitable priority rules. Whereas bona fide purchase enabled the 
defendant to keep a right in specie free a claim to that same right,23 the equitable priority rules 
governed disputes between a number of equitable proprietary rights.24 
 
II. PHILLIPS V PHILLIPS (1861) 
 
Phillips v Phillips was an equitable priority dispute between an equitable annuitant and a 
subsequent equitable interest arising under a marriage settlement. Both at first instance,25 and 
before Lord Westbury,26 the defendants’ plea of bona fide purchase was dismissed. Rather, the 
dispute was resolved by the ‘first in time’ equitable priority rule which, in the absence of 
postponing conduct,27 ranks equitable interests in order of their creation. On the facts of 
Phillips, this rule gave priority to the claimant’s prior annuity.      
The dispute originated in the intestate death of William Phillips in 1820, when his eldest 
son and heir-at-law, John Phillips, made a number of provisions for the family.28 In February 
1820, John signed a deed under which he promised to: (i) pay each of his younger siblings 
£150; and (ii) granted an annuity of £20 per annum to his youngest brother, also William 
Phillips, payable upon the death of their mother, Rebecca Phillips. In return for John’s 
undertaking, each of the younger siblings assigned their shares in their father’s personal estate 
to him. Moreover, Rebecca Phillips promised to support the younger William financially until 
her death, at which time the annuity would become payable.29 The deed recited that William 
Phillips senior was, at the time of his death, entitled to two legal estates both of which were 
mortgaged such that the legal estates were outstanding in trustees; it was the Blanaway estate 
that secured the younger William’s annuity.30 
One year later, in May 1821, John Phillips transferred the Blanaway estate to trustees to 
hold on settlement in anticipation of his marriage to Mary Roberts. It was under the terms of 
 
fide purchase as opposed to the defendant purchaser acquiring a ‘superior equity’ to the claimant by pleading the defence: 
O’Sullivan, “The Rule in Phillips v Phillips”, 319–22. 
21 As is made clear in a footnote directing the reader to subsequent litigation in the Eyre v Burmester dispute and omitting the 
1864 decision: O’Sullivan, “The Rule in Phillips v Phillips”, 311 n. 88. 
22 Namely, “an equity as distinguished from an equitable estate”: Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1167 (Ch.). 
23 A. Nair and I. Samet, “What Can ‘Equity’s Darling’ Tell Us about Equity?” in D. Klimchuk, I. Samet and H. Smith (eds.), 
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Equity (Oxford 2020), 284. 
24 Ames, “Purchase for Value Without Notice”, 3; B. McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (Oxford 2008), 187–88, 243–
44. 
25 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 66 E.R. 382, 385 (Ch.). 
26 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1166 (Ch.). 
27 Rice v Rice (1853) 61 E.R. 646, 648 (Ch.). 
28 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 66 E.R. 382, 382–83 (Ch.). 
29 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1166 (Ch.). 
30 Ibid., at 1164. 
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this settlement that the defendants to the eventual suit in Phillips, John Phillips junior and 
George Phillips, claimed title as bona fide purchasers. A few years later, in 1825, John Phillips 
senior died intestate. 
In December 1839 Rebecca Phillips died and William Phillips’ annuity became 
payable.31 The first quarterly instalment fell due the following March but was unpaid. William 
Phillips filed suit shortly afterwards, seeking an account and payment of the annuity together 
with the appointment of a receiver. By the time of suit, the equity of redemption in the 
Blanaway estate had devolved to John and George Phillips, which they held as equitable tenants 
in common.32 Their bill answered the claimant’s claim in several ways: (i) that the annuity was 
void for want of consideration; (ii) that the suit ought properly to be enforced at law; and (iii) 
that the claim fell within the Statute of Limitations.33   
It was only later on, at a subsequent hearing, that the defendants sought to raise the plea 
of bona fide purchase.34 As the legitimate children of John and Mary Phillips claiming under 
the marriage settlement, the defendants could be plausibly described as ‘purchasers for value’ 
of their equitable interest under the law as it then stood. There was a longstanding legal fiction 
that the children of a marriage were themselves parties to the settlement and so were 
‘purchasers’ of any title held under that settlement.35 Moreover, marriage consideration had 
long been recognised as ‘valuable’ consideration, both at law and in equity.36 In terms of 
‘notice’ of the prior annuity, this had to be assessed in May 1821 at the time John Phillips 
senior had transferred his interest in the Blanaway estate into the settlement.37 This was the 
most difficult element of the plea for the defendants to meet,38 but they relied upon: (i) their 
father’s covenant of 1821 that the Blanaway estate was unencumbered save for a prior legal 
mortgage;39 and (ii) their mother’s affidavit, sworn at the hearing, in which she denied any 
knowledge of the annuity at the time of her marriage.40  
Placing the substantive elements of the plea to one side however, the defendants’ main 
difficulty was a rule of pleading; the issue was that they had sought to raise the plea by way of 
an affidavit subsequently to, and separately from, their initial answer to the claimant’s bill. 
That the defendants tried to plead bona fide purchase at the hearing in this way was troublesome 
in two respects: (i) they had not pleaded the defence at the time of their initial answer to the 
claimant’s bill; and (ii) nor had they explicitly denied notice in their answers.41 This raised a 
basic issue of procedural fairness: then, as now, the broad purpose of pleading was to establish 
the arguments that were central to the dispute and therefore notifying each side of the issues 
they would need to address at the hearing.42 Yet, more prosaically, there was an established 
rule of pleading that stood in the defendants’ way, and on which point they failed before Sir 
 
31 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 66 E.R. 382, 383–84 (Ch.). 
32 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1165 (Ch.). 
33 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 66 E.R. 382, 383–84 (Ch.). 
34 Ibid., at 385–86. 
35 Felton Harvey and Dorothy his Wife v Solomon Ashley and Others (1748) 26 E.R. 1150, 1152 (Ch.); Hill v Gomme (1839) 
41 E.R. 366, 368 (Ch.). 
36 “[I]t has never been doubted that marriage is a valuable consideration”: Clarke, Representative of Dickinson, Deceased v 
Wright (1861) 158 E.R. 350, 361 (Ex.); A. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of 
Assumpsit (Oxford 1987), 364–73; Law of Property Act 1925, s. 205(1)(xxi). 
37 Bassett v Nosworthy (1673) 23 E.R. 55, 56 (Ch.). 
38 Sir John Stuart V.C. made the obvious point of the defendants that “they never could have had notice, because they were 
unborn persons at the time when the consideration passed”: Phillips v Phillips (1861) 66 E.R. 382, 385 (Ch.). 
39 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1165 (Ch.). 
40 The defendants failed on both of these points at first instance, Sir John Stuart V.C. holding that neither the covenant nor the 
affidavit provided sufficient evidence of a lack of notice: Phillips v Phillips (1861) 66 E.R. 382, 385 (Ch.). 
41 Ibid., at 383. 
42 Ibid., at 384. 
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John Stuart V.C. at first instance.43 It is worth briefly unpacking this point to make clear Lord 
Westbury’s likely objectives in his judgment in Phillips. 
 
A. The Procedural Issue 
 
To any bill in equity, the defendant could respond in one of three ways. The defendant could 
‘demur’ (i.e. refuse to answer) a bill which contained an obvious defect or drafting error, or 
which failed to disclose a material claim.44 Assuming the bill was not defective, the defendant 
was obliged to ‘answer’ the bill on oath, stating whether the facts outlined in the bill were 
true.45 However, if the claimant was dissatisfied with the initial answer, he or she was entitled 
to amend his or her original bill in order to compel further answer from the defendant.46 This 
process would normally continue until the dispute had come to a head in some way and a 
hearing became necessary. To avoid the obligation to answer on oath, with the attendant risk 
of perjury, it was necessary to raise a ‘plea’.47 A plea functioned by delineating the dispute to 
a single cause or issue which would provide a complete defence, either to the claimant’s whole 
bill or to a particular claim within the bill.48 Any claim to which the defendant could plead bona 
fide purchase was one on which the claimant could not compel an answer.49 Frequently, this 
would render the entire claim redundant, with the result that the claimant’s bill was dismissed 
entirely.50 It was in this sense that bona fide purchase functioned as a ‘plea in bar’ to equitable 
relief, thereby providing the defendant with a complete defence.51 
As a corollary of this, it had been an established rule of pleading for several decades prior 
to Phillips that bona fide purchase had to be pleaded alongside the defendant’s ‘answer’ to the 
claimant’s bill.52 This was not only so as to give the claimant fair warning, as noted above, but 
also because the plea’s success or failure would determine the extent to which the defendant 
needed to answer the bill, if at all.53 The defendants attempts to side-step this difficulty in 
Phillips were unsuccessful before Stuart V.C. who found against them for having surprised the 
claimant with new issues raised at the hearing, which deprived him “of the privilege of having 
questions fairly stated and fairly put in issue”.54 
Therefore, there was a procedural reason to find for the claimant in Phillips, which Lord 
Westbury upheld on review: “[t]he Vice Chancellor in his judgment refused to admit the 
defence… and I entirely agree with him in the conclusion that such a defence requires to be 
pleaded by the answer, more especially where an answer has been put in”.55 However, Lord 
Westbury continued:  
 
 
43 Ibid., at 385.  
44 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings and the Incidents Thereof According to the Practice of the Courts of Equity, of 
England and America, 6th ed., (Boston 1857), 432–41; C.C. Langdell, A Summary of Equity Pleading, 2nd ed., (Cambridge 
Mass. 1883), 106–08. 
45 Rowe v Teed (1808) 33 E.R. 794, 797 (Ch.); Langdell, A Summary of Equity Pleading, 2nd ed., 226. 
46 J. Mitford, A Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of Chancery, by English Bill, 5th ed., (London 1847), 15–16; 
C.C. Langdell, “Discovery under the Judicature Acts, 1873, 1875. Part II” (1897) 11 H.L.R. 205, 207–08, 211–12. 
47 C.C. Langdell, “Discovery under the Judicature Acts, 1873, 1875. Part I” (1897) 11 H.L.R. 137, 138. 
48 Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, 6th ed., 582–3. 
49 Mitford, A Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of Chancery, 5th ed., 158, 229; Langdell, A Summary of Equity 
Pleading, 2nd ed., 215–19. 
50 Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, 6th ed., 412; G. Cooper, A Treatise of Pleading on the Equity-Side of the High 
Court of Chancery (London 1809), 281. 
51 Bassett v Nosworthy (1673) 23 E.R. 55, 56 (Ch.). 
52 Lord Portarlington v Soulby (1833) 58 E.R. 628, 628; H Seton, Forms of Decrees in Equity, and of Orders Connected with 
Them: With Practical Notes, 3rd ed., vol 2, (London 1862), 1054. 
53 Rowe v Teed (1808), 33 E.R. 794, 797 (Ch.); Ovey v Leighton (1825) 57 E.R. 335, 336 (Ch.). 
54 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 66 E.R. 382, 385 (Ch.). 
55 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1166 (Ch.). 
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But I do not mean to rest my decision upon that particular ground because I have 
permitted the argument to proceed with reference to the general proposition… that 
the doctrine of a Court of equity was… that it would give no relief whatever to any 
claimant against a purchase for valuable consideration without notice.56  
 
This gives important context to Lord Westbury’s wider purpose in Phillips; His Lordship was 
not content to dismiss the suit on a point of pleading but went on to provide a substantive 
rationale for the procedural outcome. This observation is worth making because, given the 
lengths to which Lord Westbury went to explain the doctrine of bona fide purchase, it is highly 
unlikely that the judgment in Phillips does not represent Lord Westbury’s considered view on 
that doctrine. The question is: why did Lord Westbury see fit to embark on this task and what 
exactly was he trying to achieve? 
The answer is to be found by placing Phillips in its historical context; although Lord 
Westbury did not explicitly say as much, it is highly likely that His Lordship was seeking to 
address the conspicuous uncertainty surrounding bona fide purchase in this period.57 As Fry J 
would observe of the doctrine just two decades after Phillips was decided, “[c]riticisms upon 
old cases lie many strata deep, and eminent Lord Chancellors have expressed diametrically 
opposite conclusions upon the same question”.58 For this reason, as was observed of Phillips at 
the time, Lord Westbury could not provide a single, overarching enunciation of bona fide 
purchase fit to reconcile the cases, but had to make do with a survey of those contexts in which 
the plea was most frequently raised.59   
As we will see more thoroughly in the next section of the paper, Lord Westbury was 
constrained to adopt this method because the plea was widely available across several, distinct 
contexts which rendered it impossible to hone the defence down to a single fact-pattern.60 As a 
result, there was an authoritative view that saw bona fide purchase as an absolute bar to equity’s 
jurisdiction, regardless of the interests held by the parties to the dispute. Lord St Leonard’s 
extra-curial writing gave formidable weight to decisions consistent with this view of the 
defence.61 Such a view posed an obvious temptation to the defendants in Phillips,62 who after 
all were purchasers of an equitable interest for marriage consideration faced with a prior 
equitable interest.63 
Therefore, Lord Westbury’s implicit aim in Phillips was to explain both: (i) why the 
defence of bona fide purchase was, for reasons of substance, unavailable to the defendants; and 
(ii) why their dispute was instead to be resolved using the ‘first in time’ priority rule.64 The 
distinction between ‘equities’ and ‘equitable interests’ in his third category of bona fide 
purchase served both ends simultaneously by predicating each rule’s distinct sphere of 
operation upon an initial classificatory exercise.65 This served to recharacterise bona fide 
 
56 Ibid., at 1166. 
57 W. Ashburner, Principles of Equity, 1st ed., (London 1902), 67; Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch. D. 639, 646. 
58 Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch. D. 639, 646. 
59 As was observed of Phillips at the time: F. Haynes, Observations on the Defence of Purchase for Valuable Consideration 
Without Notice (London 1880), 4–5 
60 Attorney-General v Wilkins (1853) 51 E.R. 1043, 1146 (Ch.); Colyer v Finch (1856) 10 E.R. 1159, 1165 (H.L.); E. Sugden, 
A Concise and Practical Treatise of the Law of Vendors and Purchasers of Estates 14th ed., (London 1862), 721. 
61 “Till the case of Phillips v Phillips the validity of the defence against an equitable title appears not to have been questioned”: 
Sugden, A Concise and Practical Treatise, 14th ed., 798, 796–98. 
62 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 66 E.R. 382, 384 (Ch.); Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1165 (Ch.). 
63 On the specific meaning of ‘purchaser’ in the context of the defence, see: Great Investments Ltd v Warner [2016] FCAFC 
85, at [105]; Bridge et al., Megarry and Wade, 9th ed., [6–008]. 
64 Indeed, in the decade prior to Phillips, there had been a couple of decisions in which the defence had been successfully 
pleaded by the purchaser of a vested equitable interest against a prior vested equitable interest and even a prior registered 
judgment: Penny v Watts (1850) 64 E.R. 224, 233; Lane v Jackson (1855) 52 E.R. 710, 711. 
65 Ernest v Vivian (1864) 33 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 513, 519; Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch. D. 639, 646; Keate v Phillips (1881) 18 Ch. 
D. 560, 578–80; Re Ffrench’s Estate (1887) 21 L.R. (Ir.) 283, 304–05, 319–22, 331–33 (C.A. Ir.); Cloutte v Storey [1911] 1 
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purchase as a relatively narrow, instance-specific doctrine quite distinct from the equitable 
priority rules. By this means, Lord Westbury had rejuvenated an orthodoxy first laid down by 
Lord Nottingham,66 but which had since been obscured by two centuries of often inconsistent 
authority.   
With this outline of the context in which Phillips was decided, we can better appreciate 
Lord Westbury’s true thoughts on bona fide purchase.  
 
B. Lord Westbury’s Substantive Reasoning 
 
In substantive terms, Lord Westbury’s primary strategy was to reason by a process of 
elimination. Recall that the defendant’s proposition was that the bona fide purchase doctrine 
was an absolute bar to equity’s jurisdiction and generally available to innocent purchasers 
regardless of the interests held by each party to the dispute. In response, Lord Westbury 
surveyed “the three cases in which the defence in question is most commonly found” and 
concluded that “[n]one of them involve the case that is now before me”.67   
 
1. Auxiliary jurisdiction 
 
The first of Lord Westbury’s categories of bona fide purchase was the plea’s role within 
equity’s auxiliary jurisdiction. By 1861, Chancery practitioners had become accustomed of 
thinking of equitable doctrine in terms of three heads of jurisdiction: auxiliary, concurrent and 
exclusive.68 The three heads were premised upon the split-jurisdictions of law and equity.69 For 
this reason, perhaps, it did not survive the Judicature Reforms as a classificatory scheme.70  The 
auxiliary jurisdiction mostly concerned pre-suit procedure, such as the discovery of documents 
and the perpetuation of testimony.71 The claimant who filed a bill under the auxiliary 
jurisdiction was not necessarily seeking any kind of substantive relief in Chancery.72 Rather, 
the claimant would typically only come into Chancery to avail of its superior procedural 
mechanisms so as to unearth evidence needed for a parallel suit in the common law courts.73 
Therefore, the claimant who filed a bill under the auxiliary jurisdiction often did so with an eye 
toward vindicating a legal title in the law courts.74  
However, if the claimant needed Chancery’s aid to discover documents he or she believed 
to be in the defendant’s possession,75 such as title-deeds needed to prove the claimant’s title to 
the legal estate,76 then a bill for discovery would almost inevitably include a prayer for 
 
Ch. 18, 24 (C.A.). Though we will see in section V that the distinction between ‘equities’ and interests was only terminological; 
the ultimate distinction between bona fide purchase and the equitable priority rules reflected a conceptual difference of 
‘function’.  
66 Namely, that bona fide purchase was unavailable in the context of a priority dispute between several equitable interests: 
Yale, Lord Nottingham’s Chancery Cases, 162, 475; D.E.C. Yale, Lord Nottingham’s “Manual of Chancery Practice” and 
“Prolegomena of Chancery and Equity” (Cambridge 1965), 210. 
67 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1167 (Ch.). 
68 D.E.C. Yale, “A Trichotomy of Equity” (1985) 6 J.L.H. 194, 194–97. 
69 The taxonomy was not conceptually rigorous and there was no detailed consensus amongst writers as to which doctrines 
belonged under which head of jurisdiction: M. MacNair, “Equity and Conscience” (2007) 27 O.J.L.S. 659, 656–6. 
70 Yale, A Trichotomy, 194. 
71 Ind, Coope & Co v Emmerson (1887) 12 App. Cas. 300, 305 (H.L.); Ashburner, Principles of Equity, 1st ed., 10–11. 
72 Though substantive relief was not infrequently sought in the same bill: Ind, Coope & Co v Emmerson (1887) 12 App. Cas. 
300, 305 (H.L.). 
73 Mitford, A Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of Chancery, 5th ed., 64–7, 155–56, 226–29. 
74 R. Willoughby, The Distinctions and Anomalies Arising Out of the Equitable Doctrine of The Legal Estate (Cambridge 
1912), 24. 
75 J. Ames, Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays (Cambridge Mass. 1913), 266. 
76 Wallwyn v Lee (1803) 32 E.R. 509 (Ch.). 
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substantive relief; namely, the delivery-up of those deeds.77 This would necessarily prejudice 
the defendant insofar as those title-deeds could then be used to bring an action of ejectment 
against him or her in the law courts.78 From a very early period therefore, equity would not 
grant discovery or relief against a defendant who could plead bona fide purchase of the title-
deeds,79 giving the defendant the practical advantage of disabling the claimant from regaining 
possession of the land in the law courts.80   
This first category obviously had no application to the disputants in Phillips; the claimant 
was not seeking discovery in aid of proving a legal title but was suing on an equitable annuity. 
 
2. Tabula in naufragio 
Lord Westbury’s second category was the tabula in naufragio (‘plank in a shipwreck’) 
doctrine.81 The paradigm context in which the doctrine applied was an equitable priority 
dispute: a subsequent incumbrancer would acquire an equitable interest bona fide and without 
notice of prior interests, only to then discover such interests; in this context, the defendant was 
permitted to cast around for a legal right with which to improve his or her position.82 Though 
the legal right would necessarily be acquired with notice of prior interests, this did not affect 
the defendant so long as his or her initial purchase had been made without notice.83 If the 
‘shipwreck’ was an equitable priority dispute, then the legal ‘plank’ was the way by which a 
subsequent incumbrancer could escape the ‘first in time’ priority rules and avail of the 
alternative rule that: ‘where the equities are equal, the legal title prevails’.84 
There were two broad ways in which a legal right could help the defendant. Certain rights, 
such as an old satisfied term, would give the defendant the paramount right to possess land at 
law.85 Depending on the circumstances, this right to possession may provide the defendant with 
leverage against a prior equitable incumbrancer for whom obtaining possession of the land was 
the first step toward realising an equitable right of redemption.86 Alternatively, the defendant 
could acquire a precedent legal mortgage to which he or she could then ‘tack’ his or her 
subsequent equitable mortgage.87 In both instances it was not necessary that the legal title was 
vested in the defendant personally; it would suffice if the right was held by a trustee on the 
defendant’s behalf thereby giving the defendant the ‘better right’ to call for the legal title as 
against prior incumbrancers.88   
The defendants in Phillips sought to bring themselves within the scope of the tabula in 
naufragio doctrine by arguing that the fact of their possession of the land constituted a ‘tabula’ 
of which they would not be deprived as bona fide purchasers. This was obviously untenable: 
the legal tabula had to give the defendants the paramount legal right to possess the land at law; 
 
77 Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 266. 
78 Carver v Pinto Leite (1871–72) L.R. 7 Ch. App. 90 (C.A.); Sugden, A Concise and Practical Treatise, 14th ed., 503. 
79 Bassett v Nosworthy (1673) 23 E.R. 55, 55 (Ch.). 
80 Ibid., at 56; Langdell, “Discovery under the Judicature Acts, 1873, 1875. Part II”, 211–12. 
81 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1167 (Ch.); Yale, Lord Nottingham’s Chancery Cases, 69–87. 
82 Marsh v Lee (1670) 86 E.R. 473, 474 (K.B.); Le Neve v Le Neve (1747) 26 E.R. 1172, 1175–77 (Ch.); Wortley v Birkhead 
(1754) 28 E.R. 364, 365–66 (Ch.); Willoughby v Willoughby (1756) 28 E.R. 571, 579 (Ch.); Yale, Lord Nottingham’s Chancery 
Cases, 69–87, 160–64. 
83 Wortley v Birkhead (1754) 28 E.R. 364, 366 (Ch.). 
84 Brace v Duchess of Marlborough (1728) 24 E.R. 829, 831 (Ch.); Willoughby v Willoughby (1756) 28 E.R. 571, 582 (Ch.); 
E. Snell, The Principles of Equity: Intended for the Use of Students and the Profession, 1st ed., (London 1868), 108. 
85 Willoughby v Willoughby (1756) 28 E.R. 571, 578 (Ch.); Goleborn v Alcock (1829) 57 E.R. 894, 895 (Ch.). 
86 Chinnery v Evans (1864) 11 E.R. 1274, 1283 (H.L.); Willoughby v Willoughby (1756) 28 E.R. 571, 579 (Ch.). 
87 By ‘tacking’ we mean the defendant’s amalgamating his or her two securities to the prejudice of an intermediate, equitable 
incumbrancer. In order to ‘tack’ securities in this way the defendant obviously needed to get the precedent legal mortgage: 
Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1167 (Ch.); Rooper v Harrison (1855) 69 E.R. 704, 713–14 (Ch.). 
88 Willoughby v Willoughby (1756) 28 E.R. 571, 579 (Ch.). 
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the mere fact of possession of the land did not qualify.89 As Lord Westbury noted, “[t]he 
purchaser will not be deprived of anything that gives him a legal right to the possession, but 
the possession itself must not be confounded with the right to it”.90 Indeed, the freehold estates 
were vested in legal mortgagees who did not hold those estates on trust for the defendants. 
Moreover, there was no ‘practical advantage’ to securing possession of the land against a prior, 
equitable annuitant who did not have any right to redeem specific land. In short, there was no 
analogy to draw between the dispute in Phillips and the typical fact-pattern in which the tabula 
in naufragio doctrine operated. 
 
3. The third category: ‘equities’ and ‘equitable interests’  
It is worth our setting out the third of Lord Westbury’s categories of bona fide purchase again 
in full: 
[W]here there are circumstances that give rise to an equity as distinguished from 
an equitable estate—as for example, an equity to set aside a deed for fraud, or to 
correct it for mistake—and the purchaser under the instrument maintains the plea 
of purchase for valuable consideration without notice, the Court will not interfere.91 
 
We should pause here and make three observations. First, Lord Westbury had set himself the 
task of surveying the extant legal landscape to gather together common instances of the plea, 
and therefore, His Lordship was obliged to acknowledge a significant number of cases in which 
the court had recognised bona fide purchase as a defence against claims to rescind or rectify a 
deed, whether the defendant had acquired a legal estate,92 or an equitable interest.93 By 1861, 
these decisions were not few and must have been present to Lord Westbury’s mind.94 However, 
no prior decision within this line of authority had phrased the defence’s availability in terms of 
an initial distinction between ‘equities’ and ‘equitable interests’;95 though the phraseology was 
not novel, the use of it to distinguish the title-clearing defence from the equitable priority rules 
represents an original contribution of Lord Westbury.96   
Therefore, and second, it is highly unlikely that Lord Westbury intended to exclude bona 
fide purchasers of equitable interests from his third category. Though strictly the third category 
was expressed in such a way as to be agnostic as to the type of right acquired by the defendant,97 
the distinction between ‘equities’ and ‘equitable interests’ would have otherwise been 
redundant if Lord Westbury had intended to limit the defence to those who had acquired legal 
 
89 Ibid., at 579; Chinnery v Evans (1864) 11 E.R. 1274, 1283 (H.L.) (Lord Westbury). 
90 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1167 (Ch.). 
91 Ibid., at 1167. 
92 Earl of Ardglasse v Muschamp (1684) 23 E.R. 438, 439 (Ch.); Warrick v Warrick & Kniveton (1745) 26 E.R. 970, 972 
(Ch.); Bell v Cundall (1750) 27 E.R.63, 63 (Ch.); Kennedy v Green (1834) 40 E.R. 266, 274 (Ch.); Addis v Campbell (1841) 
49 E.R. 394, 397 (Ch.). 
93 Malden v Menill (1737) 26 E.R. 402, 405 (Ch.); Sturge v Starr (1833) 39 E.R. 918, 919 (Ch.); Kennedy v Green (1834) 40 
E.R. 266, 274 (Ch.); Robert Cole Bowen, a Minor, by his Mother and Next Friend v John Evans and Others (1848) 9 E.R. 
1090, 1100 (H.L.); Bellamy v Sabine (1857) 44 E.R. 842, 847 (Ch.); Ogilvie v Jeaffreson (1860) 66 E.R. 147, 158 (Ch.). For 
this reason, it is something of a misnomer to speak of ‘the rule’ in Phillips v Phillips as though it first arose in 1861; it is more 
accurate to say that Lord Westbury rationalised a pre-existing rule. 
94 Lord Westbury had served as counsel in several cases concerning rescission in the years immediately prior to Phillips, and 
had successfully invoked the plea of bona fide purchase for the defendants in Bowen v Evans before the Lords in 1848: Bowen 
v Evans (1848) 9 E.R. 1090, 1098 (H.L.); Gresley v Mousley (1859) 45 E.R. 31, 33–34 (Ch.); Harper v Hayes (1860) 45 E.R. 
731, 732–33 (Ch.).  
95 There was an alternative line of authority in which the claim to rescind was characterised as an immediate equitable interest: 
Stump v Gaby (1852) 42 E.R. 1015, 1018 (Ch.); Gresley v Mousley (1856) 69 E.R. 789, 791 (Ch.). 
96 Westminster Bank v Lee [1956] Ch. 7, 18–19. 
97 As observed by O’Sullivan: O’Sullivan, “The Rule in Phillips v Phillips”, 309. 
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rights in the way O’Sullivan suggests.98 Finally, the language vis-à-vis bona fide purchase in 
the gobbet above is extremely clear; if Lord Westbury had meant to say that the defence was 
not available to the purchaser of an equitable interest against a prior equity then His Lordship 
chose his words uncharacteristically poorly.99 
In any event, Lord Westbury used the distinction between ‘equities’ and ‘equitable 
interests’ to dispose of the defendants’ attempt to raise the plea in Phillips. The claimant was 
not seeking to rescind nor to rectify the marriage settlement under which the defendants’ 
claimed. Indeed, the claimant did not have any kind of an ‘equity’ but a vested equitable 
interest, with the result that “grantees and incumbrancers claiming in equity take and are ranked 
according to the dates of their securities; and the maxim applies, ‘Qui prior est tempore potior 
est jure’”.100  
 
C. Phillips: Concluding Remarks 
Lord Westbury did not manage to quell the uncertainty surrounding bona fide purchase 
entirely, but it was no small achievement that Phillips was accepted by near-contemporaries as 
having conclusively delineated the equitable priority rules from bona fide purchase.101 Within 
thirty years of the decision in Phillips, Ames was able to state in the inaugural issue of the 
Harvard Law Review that: 
It seems to have been a common opinion in early times that a court of equity would 
give no assistance against a purchaser for value without notice. But, in Phillips v 
Phillips, which at once became, and has since continued to be, the leading authority 
on this subject, this doctrine, which Mr. Sugden [the Lord St. Leonards] 
strenuously defended to the last, was definitively rejected.102 
 
By way of his survey of the doctrine, together with his method of reasoning by process of 
elimination, Lord Westbury established that bona fide purchase was not generally available to 
any-and-all purchasers who could discharge the elements of the plea. For O’Sullivan, the 
outline above does indeed represent orthodoxy,103 but that orthodoxy is itself the product of a 
consistent misinterpretation of Lord Westbury’s reasoning.104 In O’Sullivan’s analysis, Lord 
Westbury’s true approach to bona fide purchase and the equitable priority rules was very 
different from that presented above. We are now in a sure position to evaluate O’Sullivan’s 
argument.   
 
III. O’SULLIVAN’S ANALYSIS 
 
There are two broad limbs to O’Sullivan’s thesis concerning Lord Westbury’s views on bona 
fide purchase. First, concerning bona fide purchase, O’Sullivan maintains that Lord Westbury 
did not in truth think that the defence was available to the purchaser of an equitable interest 
 
98 Ibid., at 308–09. 
99 Lucidity was a particular virtue of Lord Westbury’s judgments, which Holdsworth held up as “remarkable for their clear 
polished style, their clarity and their conciseness”: W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 1st ed., vol. XVI, (London 
1923), 87. 
100 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1166 (Ch.). 
101 Ernest v Vivian (1864) 33 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 513, 519; Cory v Eyre (1863) 46 E.R. 58, 65 (Ch.); Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch. 
D. 639, 646 (Ch.); Ashburner, Principles of Equity, 75–7. 
102 J Ames, “Purchase for Value without Notice” (1887) 1 H.L.R. 1, 1. 
103 O’Sullivan, “The Rule in Phillips v Phillips”, 304, 310. 
104 Ibid., at 297. 
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when faced with a prior ‘equity’ to rescind.105 Rather, Lord Westbury would have limited it to 
those purchasers who had acquired a legal right or advantage on the occasion of their 
purchase.106 O’Sullivan claims that we can see evidence for this view in Phillips in which, as 
we saw above, Lord Westbury rejected the defendants’ argument that their factual possession 
of land gave them a ‘legal advantage’ which, as bona fide purchasers, a Court of equity would 
not deprive them.107  
O’Sullivan buttresses this interpretation of Phillips by reference to Lord Westbury’s 
decision in Eyre v Burmester, in which the demarcation between bona fide purchase of an 
equitable interest and the ‘first in time’ priority rule was relevant to the outcome. The claimant 
Eyre had been granted a legal mortgage over several Irish estates owned by his solicitor, John 
Sadleir. Eyre’s mortgage was registered in December 1854.108 However, Sadleir was deeply 
indebted to a bank in London from whom he then sought to borrow a further £95,000. The bank 
agreed and had advanced £75,000 by early August 1855 before its solicitor discovered the prior 
mortgage to Eyre.109 The bank refused to proceed unless Sadleir got a release of Eyre’s 
mortgage. Sadleir convinced the bank that he could secure the release by offering Eyre 
alternative securities; satisfied by this, the bank forwarded the remaining money to Sadleir and 
the mortgage was completed.110   
It was not until October 1855 that Sadleir convinced Eyre to release his mortgage in 
exchange for a number of securities; in this transaction, although Eyre had acquired a legitimate 
mortgage over another estate in Ireland, Sadleir had also handed him forged shares and 
promissory notes.111 This was sufficient fraud to render Eyre’s release voidable.112 The legal 
estates reconveyed to Sadleir remained with him until his suicide in February 1856 and were 
never transferred to the bank’s nominated trustees.113 In June 1857, the estates were ordered to 
be sold and the proceeds were transferred to the bank; it was not until June 1858 that Eyre filed 
a bill to rescind the release and claim a share of the proceeds commensurate with his original 
mortgage.114    
In prior litigation before the Lord Chancellor in Ireland, the bank had successfully 
pleaded bona fide purchase for value without notice of Sadleir’s fraud upon Eyre.115 The Lords 
held the defence inapplicable on the facts because the bank had failed to get a transfer of a legal 
estate from Sadleir before he committed suicide. As Lord Westbury noted:  
 
A purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, will not be deprived by a 
Court of equity of any advantage at law which he has fairly obtained for his 
protection. But in the present case the estate reconveyed by Eyre, remained in 
Sadleir, and was never conveyed by Sadleir to the bank.116   
 
O’Sullivan interprets this as a statement of principle; bona fide purchase only protected a legal 
right or advantage, such that the defence was not available to the bank on the facts of Eyre v 
Burmester. O’Sullivan observes: 
 
105 Ibid., at 309. 
106 Ibid., at 309. 
107 Ibid., at 309. 
108 Eyre v Burmester (1862) 11 E.R. 959, 960 (H.L.). 
109 Eyre v Burmester (1864) 46 E.R. 987, 989 (Ch.). 
110 Eyre v Burmester (1862) 11 E.R. 959, 960 (H.L.); Eyre v Burmester (1864) 46 E.R. 987, 989 (Ch.). 
111 Ibid., at 960. 
112 Ibid., at 964. 
113 Ibid., at 961. 
114 Ibid., at 961. 
115 Ibid., at 962. 




The indications are that for Lord Westbury, save in the special case of tabula in 
naufragio, the availability of the plea of bona fide purchase did not turn on whether 
the defendant purchased a legal or equitable interest, but on whether it was raised 
to protect a legal right or advantage he had obtained in making the purchase.117 
 
This leads to the second limb of O’Sullivan’s argument. Although, in Phillips, Lord Westbury 
unambiguously distinguished ‘equities’ from ‘equitable interests’ in his third category of the 
defence, O’Sullivan maintains that “[i]t is however not clear that Lord Westbury also says that 
the general rule (that rules of equitable priority and… not the plea of bona fide purchase 
determine the priority of successive equitable interests in property) only applies to interests 
that are not ‘equities’”.118 Lord Westbury did not therefore truly intend the distinction to 
demarcate bona fide purchase from the ‘first in time’ priority rule.  
Once more, the evidence in support of this second limb is drawn from Eyre v Burmester; 
as we saw above, Lord Westbury seemingly disallowed the defence because the bank had not 
acquired the legal estate. Insofar as the legal estates remained in Sadleir at the time of his death, 
counsel for the bank acknowledged that its mortgage was purely equitable vis-à-vis the estates 
included in the bank’s security,119 but which had previously been released to Sadleir by Eyre.120 
The Lords accepted that the bank had purchased this interest without notice of Sadleir’s fraud 
upon Eyre. Given the bank’s bona fide acquisition of an equitable mortgage without notice, 
Lord Westbury was faced with the exact fact-pattern of the third category of the defence he 
had previously outlined in Phillips v Phillips. Nevertheless, Lord Westbury did not follow that 
rule but instead applied the ‘first in time’ priority rule in Eyre’s favour. It follows that Lord 
Westbury’s true view was that equities to rescind ‘registered’ within the equitable priority rules 
and were not therefore subject to the plea of bona fide purchase. O’Sullivan concludes: 
 
Thus the innocent purchaser of an equitable interest in property could not plead 
bona fide purchase as against a prior claim to recover that property on rescission; 
the dispute was regulated by the principles of equitable assignment and priority; 
and the purchaser therefore obtained the interest subject to the claim to rescind. 
This is shown in his Lordship's decision in Eyre v Burmester, decided several 
months after Phillips v. Phillips.121 
 
It is therefore clear that both limbs of O’Sullivan’s argument represent two prongs in the same, 
general attack upon the orthodox interpretation of Phillips. It is because Lord Westbury limited 
the defence to those who had acquired a legal right or advantage at the time of their purchase 
that, in a dispute between an equity and an equitable interest in Eyre v Burmester, His Lordship 
applied the ‘first in time’ priority rule.   
 
 
IV. O’SULLIVAN’S READING OF EYRE V BURMESTER (1862) 
 
In truth, there is little support to be found in favour of either limb of O’Sullivan’s argument in 
Eyre v Burmester. Rather, Eyre’s litigation to assert his entitlement to rescind against the 
 
117 O’Sullivan, “The Rule in Phillips v Phillips”, 309. 
118 Ibid., at 310. 
119 Eyre v Burmester (1864) 46 E.R. 987, 989 (Ch.). 
120 Eyre v Burmester (1862) 11 E.R. 959, 963 (H.L.). 
121 O’Sullivan, “The Rule in Phillips v Phillips”, 311. 
13 
 
defendant bank really tells against O’Sullivan’s thesis. We shall reflect upon each limb of his 
argument to demonstrate this. 
 
A. First Limb: Bona Fide Purchase of a Legal Right or Advantage? 
Regarding O’Sullivan’s view that Lord Westbury would have limited the defence of bona fide 
purchase to those who had acquired some legal right or advantage on the occasion of their 
purchase, the answer must be that the interpretive pickings are slim; neither the structure nor 
the language of either decision really supports O’Sullivan’s view.   
Turning first to Phillips, the discussion of legal right or advantage was only relevant to 
the defendants’ attempt to invoke the protection of the tabula in naufragio doctrine; after all, 
they were the subsequent equitable incumbrancers who needed the legal ‘plank’ in the 
shipwreck. Indeed, the only point in the judgment at which Lord Westbury uses the language 
of ‘legal advantage’ is in his discussion of that doctrine. This suggests that Lord Westbury’s 
reference to ‘legal advantage’ in Phillips was purely negative; it only sought to deny the 
defendants a route toward the tabula in naufragio and did not advance any positive conception 
of the defence that tied its availability to the acquisition of a legal right or advantage in the way 
O’Sullivan suggests.    
The same point holds true of Eyre v Burmester. Again, from the defendant bank’s 
perspective, the doctrine of tabula in naufragio made most sense given that the bank had a 
subsequent equitable interest. The obvious difficulty was that the bank had never acquired the 
legal estates from Sadleir. Counsel for the bank sought to close this gap via estoppel, arguing 
that insofar as the release had been made purposefully “with Eyre's knowledge and 
concurrence” he was estopped from denying the efficacy of Sadleir’s acquisition of the legal 
estate for the bank.122 The Lords unanimously rejected this argument on a finding of fact; Eyre 
had not even known about Sadleir’s dealings with the bank at the time he had given the release. 
The other route toward the tabula in naufragio was to argue that, despite its non-acquisition of 
the legal estates, the bank nonetheless had the ‘better right’ to call for the estates in Sadleir’s 
hands. This argument was also rejected; given the fraud Sadleir had exercised to gain the 
release, it was Eyre who had the ‘better right’ to call for those estates.123 As Lord Westbury 
noted: 
 
A purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, will not be deprived by a 
Court of equity of any advantage at law which he has fairly obtained for his 
protection. But in the present case the estate reconveyed by Eyre, remained in 
Sadleir, and was never conveyed by Sadleir to the bank…. the claim of Eyre is 
against Sadleir by paramount right, to recover the estate of which Eyre had been 
deprived by fraud, and Sadleir acquired no interest to feed his prior contract by 
virtue of that fraudulent transaction.124 
Just like the reasoning by elimination we saw in Phillips, Lord Westbury’s discussion of legal 
right or advantage in Eyre v Burmester was solely negative; the discussion sought only to reject 
the bank’s attempt to raise the tabula in naufragio doctrine and cannot be read as a prescription 
that the defendant acquire a legal right or ‘advantage’ in order to plead bona fide purchase. 
Moreover, as we shall see below, in a subsequent dispute in the Eyre v Burmester litigation in 
 
122 Eyre v Burmester (1862) 11 E.R. 959, 962–63 (H.L.). 
123 Ibid., at 964. Lord St. Leonards had previously reached the same conclusion on this point: Bowen v Evans (1844) 1 Jo. & 
Lat. 178, 265. 
124 Ibid., at 964. 
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1864, Lord Westbury recognised the availability of the plea to purchasers of equitable 
interests.125 The first limb of O’Sullivan’s argument must therefore be rejected. 
 
B. Second Limb: ‘Equities’ and ‘Equitable Interests’ 
Turning now turn to the second limb of the argument, O’Sullivan sees evidence in Eyre v 
Burmester that, faced with a dispute between an ‘equity’ to rescind and a subsequent equitable 
interest, Lord Westbury disallowed the plea of bona fide purchase and resolved the dispute 
using the ‘first in time’ priority rule. If this is true, the third category of bona fide purchase 
outlined in Phillips could not have been seriously meant. For two reasons, this inference from 
Eyre v Burmester is also unwarranted. 
First, the third category of bona fide purchase was inapplicable on the fact-pattern of 
Eyre v Burmester because the bank acquired its equitable mortgage in August 1855 before Eyre 
was fraudulently induced to release his mortgage in October of that year.126 The whole logic of 
bona fide purchase was, and remains, that the defendant acquired an interest without knowledge 
or notice of prior entitlements;127 the plea had no relevance to the bank because they acquired 
their interest before Eyre’s equity to rescind even existed. Lord Westbury acknowledged as 
much himself in 1864 when, in a subsequent instalment of the Eyre v Burmester litigation, he 
observed of the Lords’ decision in 1862: “[t]he House had not to consider the effect of any 
dealing, subsequent to and on the faith of [Eyre’s] release, between John Sadleir and a 
purchaser for valuable consideration without notice”.128   
This leads to the second key point: O’Sullivan overlooks the prior role of rescission in 
Lord Westbury’s application of the equitable priority rules to the dispute. We can see this 
clearly if we make explicit some of the unstated premises in Lord Westbury’s reasoning on this 
point. To do so, it is worth remembering that, in this period, equitable rescission was 
understood as a court-administered remedy characterised by a high degree of judicial control 
and oversight.129 A claimant who had transferred title under an impugned transaction would 
file a bill to have that transfer ‘set aside’.130 Relief would be granted in the form of a final decree 
setting out instructions for a reconveyance of title, the delivery-up and cancellation of relevant 
conveyancing documents,131 and the quantification of any monetary payments necessary to 
effect full restitutio in integrum between the parties.132 The court’s overarching aim throughout 
this process was to unwind the transaction ab initio.133 
A key aspect of rescission was that the transferee was held to be a constructive trustee of 
any property originally transferred by the claimant.134 The award of rescission explains Lord 
 
125 Ibid., at 990. 
126 “[T]he only foundation of the bank’s claim, is the mortgage by Sadleir prior to the deed of reconveyance”: ibid., at 964 
Lord Westbury. 
127 Great Investments Ltd v Warner [2016] FCAFC 85 at [105]. 
128 Eyre v Burmester (1864) 46 E.R. 987, 990 (Ch.); Gibbs v British Linen Co. (1875) 4 R. 630, 635 (C.S.O.H.) (Lord Shand).  
129 “[A] Court of Equity requires that those who come to it to ask its active interposition to give them relief, should use due 
diligence”: Erlanger v The New Sombrero Phosphate Co. (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1218, 1278 (H.L.) (Lord Blackburn).  
130 In the decade following Phillips, the traditional equitable terminology of ‘setting aside’ an impugned transaction came to 
be recast in terms of the common law distinction between ‘void’ and ‘voidable’ transactions: Richard Oakes v William 
Turquand and R P Harding (Peek v The Same, In re Overend, Gurney & Co.) (1867) L.R. 2 H.L. 325, 345–46 (Lord 
Chelmsford L.C.); Spackman v Evans (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 171, 245 (Lord Romilly); Reese River Silver Mining Co. Ltd. v Smith 
(1869-70) L.R. 4 H.L. 64, 73 (Lord Hatherley L.C.). 
131 Heath v Crealock (1874-75) L.R. 10 Ch. App. 22, 30–32 (C.A.). 
132 Coulson v Allison (1860) 66 E.R. 117, 120 (Ch.). 
133 Small v Attwood (1832) 159 E.R. 1051, 1101 (Ex.); J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, as Administered in 
England and America, 7th ed., vol. II, (Boston 1857), 219. 
134 J. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence: As Administered in the United States of America, 1st ed., vol. 2, (San 
Francisco 1882), 628–29; Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, 7th ed., 633. 
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Westbury’s reasoning in Eyre v Burmester; it was because Eyre was entitled to rescind that he 
had the precedent equitable interest against the bank’s subsequent equitable mortgage. It is true 
that Lord Westbury described the outcome in terms of reinstating Eyre to his original security, 
but placing Eyre back to his position ab initio was premised upon equitable relief by way of 
rescission:    
 
Whilst the estate remained in Sadleir, so long was it liable to be pursued and 
recovered by Eyre… the only foundation of the bank's claim, is the mortgage by 
Sadleir prior to the deed of reconveyance. That mortgage and contract would bind 
any interest subsequently acquired by Sadleir. But under the reconveyance he 
obtained none; for, as between Sadleir and Eyre, the latter was still the owner, and 
might at any time during the life of Sadleir, by bill in equity have set aside the 
release, and obtained a reconveyance of the estate, and an interim injunction to 
restrain any alienation of it by Sadleir. This equitable title still remains unimpaired, 
and ought to be preferred to any claim by the bank.135 
 
That Eyre acquired an equitable interest by way of equitable rescission is also clear in Lord 
Westbury’s modification of the final order: Eyre would need to account to the bank for the 
value of a legitimate security he had acquired from Sadleir in exchange for the release; this is 
best understood as an award of rescission on terms that Eyre make restitutio in integrum to 
Sadleir’s successor in title, the bank.136   
By virtue of rescission, Eyre was entitled to a prior equitable interest as against the bank’s 
subsequent equitable mortgage; Lord Westbury, and the other Lords, then applied the equitable 
priority rules to resolve the dispute. It follows that it was not Eyre’s equity to rescind that 
‘registered’ within the equitable priority rules, but rather the equitable interest that arose once 
that Eyre’s claim to rescind had been vindicated at suit.137 It is only by overlooking rescission 
as an intermediate step in Lord Westbury’s reasoning that O’Sullivan manages to argue that 
‘equities’ were held in Eyre v Burmester to bind subsequent interests under the ‘first in time’ 
priority rule. 
 
C. Eyre v Burmester (1864) 
However, it is not simply that O’Sullivan’s interpretation of Eyre v Burmester has several weak 
points; the conclusive argument against O’Sullivan’s argument are comments made by Lord 
Westbury in the Court of Chancery in 1864 in a subsequent dispute between Eyre and the bank. 
This decision makes clear that Lord Westbury would have allowed the plea of bona fide 
purchase to the purchaser of an equitable interest against a prior ‘equity’ to rescind; His 
Lordship therefore meant that he said in his third category of bona fide purchase in Phillips v 
Phillips.138    
Of the estates that Eyre had released to Sadleir in October 1855 and which were then 
mortgaged to the bank, one of them, the Castle Green estate, had only given Eyre an equitable 
 
135 Eyre v Burmester (1862) 11 E.R. 959, 964–65 (H.L.). To a modern readership, the language used by Lord Westbury is 
more suggestive of a ‘void’ rather than ‘voidable’ transaction. Nonetheless, the proper analysis of Eyre v Burmester is that 
Eyre gave a voidable release to Sadleir. A few years after Eyre v Burmester, Lord Chelmsford L.C. clarified that the traditional 
terminology of ‘setting aside’ a transaction for fraud in equity equated to rescission of a ‘voidable’ transaction: Oakes v 
Turquand (1867) L.R. 2 H.L. 325, 345–46.  
136 “[A]ny additional security under the agreement of the 6th October 1855, not comprised in [Eyre’s] original mortgage… 
must be given up or accounted for to the bank”: Eyre v Burmester (1862) 11 E.R. 959, 965 (H.L.). 
137 “[T]he equity is distinct from, because logically antecedent to, the equitable interest”: Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel 
Terrigal Pty. Ltd. [1965] 113 CLR 265, 276 (Kitto J). 
138 For an overview and application of Lord Westbury’s reasoning in the 1864 instalment of the Eyre v Burmester litigation, 
see: Gibbs v British Linen Co. (1875) 4 R. 630, 636 (C.S.O.H.). 
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mortgage; the legal estate had been outstanding in a prior mortgagee. Therefore, Sadleir had 
only acquired the equity of redemption by Eyre’s release. A few months later, in December 
1855, Sadleir then remortgaged that equitable estate to a firm named Backhouse.139 The London 
and County Bank (the defendant in the Lords’ decision in 1862) had a prior equitable mortgage 
but had joined in Sadleir’s conveyance to Backhouse expressly undertaking to postpone its 
security to the subsequent equitable mortgage.140 It did so in exchange for the lion’s share of 
the money forwarded to Sadleir by Backhouse; of the £36,000 Backhouse advanced to Sadleir 
he only retained £1000 of it and then paid £35,000 to the bank.141 After Sadleir’s suicide in 
February 1856, Backhouse sold the land pursuant to a court order and, after the legal mortgage 
had been discharged, there was a residue of £17,694 which Backhouse kept. 
Eyre’s bill in the 1864 suit was curiously pleaded; Eyre sought to claim the £17,694 
residue for himself, not out of the hands of Backhouse, but out of the £35,000 the bank had 
received before the order for sale.142 Eyre obviously could not have had a claim to the proceeds 
of sale that had discharged the legal mortgagee and the Backhouse mortgage; both securities 
had been acquired by bona fide purchasers. As such, there were no traceable proceeds of the 
estate against which Eyre could assert his claim to rescind. For this reason, Eyre in effect sought 
to claim the residue of £17,694 from the bank on the wide premise that the £35,000 it received 
represented the ‘proceeds’ of Sadleir’s fraud.143 Lord Westbury rejected the argument, but 
outlined the circumstances in which Eyre could have been said to have had a viable claim: 
 
It was ingeniously put in argument… that the money was obtained by the use of a 
fraudulent instrument, and that the person who had suffered by that use of the fraud 
which had been practised upon him had a right to pursue that which was obtained 
by means of that fraud. That might have been perfectly right if the money had been 
still in the hands of the Messrs Backhouse or in the Incumbered Estates Court. The 
Plaintiff might then have had a right to say that he was still the prior incumbrancer; 
and although he could not have recovered against the Messrs Backhouse, as 
purchasers for valuable consideration on the faith of his release, anything to the 
prejudice of their security, yet he might have pursued, subject to that right, the 
whole of the property that was comprised in the release, and also in the mortgage 
to the Messrs. Backhouse. But that is not the transaction. The Plaintiff admits that 
he cannot follow the estate. He admits that he has no claim against the Messrs 
Backhouse.144 
This gives us a clear insight into Lord Westbury’s understanding of bona fide purchase. In the 
passage above, Lord Westbury considers Eyre’s claim to the residue of the Castle Green estate, 
and explains that, because Backhouse had acquired an equitable interest as a bona fide 
purchaser without notice of Eyre’s equity to rescind, it would be entitled to the satisfaction of 
its equitable mortgage before Eyre could claim the residue; an instance of the ‘third party 
rights’ bar to equitable rescission.145 In short, because Backhouse had acquired an equitable 
mortgage “as purchasers for valuable consideration on the faith of his release”, they took free 
of Eyre’s equity to rescind. Of course, the obvious difficulty from Eyre’s perspective was that 
 
139 Eyre v Burmester (1864) 46 E.R. 987, 989 (Ch.). 
140 Ibid., at 990. 
141 The mortgage deed stated the total loan to be £89,072: ibid., at 990. 
142 Ibid., at 990. 
143 Ibid., at 990. 
144 Ibid., at 990–1. 
145 “[The claimant] can rescind the contract only subject to all the rights of innocent third parties”: In Re Overend, Gurney & 
Co, Ex Parte Oakes and Peek (1867) L.R. 3 Eq. 576, at 607–08.  
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the Backhouse mortgage exhausted the proceeds of sale. Yet Lord Westbury also rejected 
Eyre’s claim to a share of the £35,000 received by the bank;146 in today’s language, Eyre did 
not have a ‘proprietary base’ in the money Backhouse had originally paid to Sadleir.147 
Moreover, the bank had given value and received legal title to the money without notice of 
Sadleir’s fraud; it was therefore entitled to keep that money.148   
The 1864 decision in the Eyre v Burmester litigation contravenes both limbs of 
O’Sullivan’s argument: (i) Eyre’s prior mere equity to rescind did not register within the ‘first 
in time’ priority rules so as to give him priority over Backhouse’s subsequent equitable interest; 
and (ii) Lord Westbury recognised that, as against Eyre’s mere equity, the plea of bona fide 
purchase was available to the purchaser of an equitable interest. O’Sullivan’s paper overlooks 
the 1864 decision which conclusively proves that Lord Westbury did not hold the view that 
O’Sullivan ascribes to him. In consequence, O’Sullivan’s argument ought to be rejected. 
 
V. PHILLIPS V PHILLIPS: THEN AND NOW 
 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it follows that the orthodox interpretation of Phillips v 
Phillips is true to Lord Westbury’s intentions; His Lordship did indeed consider the title-
clearing defence to be available to purchasers of equitable interests against prior ‘equities’. In 
disputes concerning purely equitable entitlements, it is this initial distinction that serves to 
demarcate disputes resolved by bona fide purchase, and those resolved using the ‘first in time’ 
priority rule. This is certainly how subsequent cases have understood the task of applying 
Phillips,149 and the distinction between ‘equities’ and interests therefore retains practical 
relevance today. Although competitions between proprietary interests are nowadays usually 
determined by statutory code, there remain certain classes of dispute in which the traditional 
priority rules still determine the outcome.150 
There remains a difficulty however, in that it seems that Lord Westbury solved one 
practical problem only by introducing another; namely, the ongoing task of identifying the 
hallmarks of ‘equities’.151 Insofar as there is no certain frame of reference to determine the 
content and classification of ‘equities’, we cannot reliably apply bona fide purchase to the 
exclusion of the equitable priority rules.152 Indeed, this approach has come in for trenchant 
criticism,153 such that its utility has been doubted.154 In the recent-most edition of Equity: 
Doctrines and Remedies the authors repeat a claim made in earlier editions that, “[t]o explain 
such an exception to the [‘first in time’ priority rule] in terms of a distinction between mere 
equities and equitable interests… smacks of circularity and the description of an effect as if it 
were a cause”.155 It follows that Phillips did not manage to solve the ultimate problem raised 
by that dispute, so much as recast it in taxonomical terms; to paraphrase Lord Eldon, Lord 
Westbury “missed his object in the extent [to] which he meant to acquire it”.156 A flavour of 
having identified a reductio ad absurdum in Lord Westbury’s efforts underlies O’Sullivan’s 
observation that: 
 
146 Eyre v Burmester (1864) 46 E.R. 987, 990–91 (Ch.). 
147 For an overview of the concept of a ‘proprietary base’ see: Nair, Claims to Traceable Proceeds, 173–81. 
148 Eyre v Burmester (1864) 46 E.R. 987, 990–91 (Ch.). 
149 Double Bay Newspapers Pty. Ltd. v AW Holdings Pty. Ltd. [1997] 42 NSWLR 409, 423–25. 
150 Such as claims to traceable proceeds: Fox, “Purchase for Value Without Notice”, 74–75. 
151 B. Häcker, “Proprietary Restitution after Impaired Consent Transfers: A Generalised Power Model” [2009] 68 C.L.J. 324, 
329–31. 
152 A. Everton, “‘Equitable Interests’ and ‘Equities’ – In Search of a Pattern” (1976) 40 Conv. 209, 219–20. 
153 J.D. Heydon, M.J. Leeming and P.G. Turner, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, 5th ed., (Chatswood NSW 2015), [4–210]. 
154 Ruthol Pty. Ltd. v Mills [2003] NSWCA 56, at [112]. 
155 Heydon et al., Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, 5th ed., [4–210]. 




[C]oncluding that bona fide purchase of an equitable interest is a defence to a prior 
equity also requires a narrow reading of Lord Westbury's general rule [outlined in 
Phillips] that the plea of bona fide purchase is inapplicable in determining priority 
between successive equitable interests in property, which are governed by the rules 
of equitable assignment and priority. That general rule must be read so as not to 
extend to ‘equities’. This is the orthodoxy today. It provides that the general rule 
only applies to ‘equitable interests’, ‘equities’ are not equitable interests, and for 
this reason equities are outside the general rule. Subsequent cases have thus been 
concerned with difficult exercises in taxonomy, determining whether the plaintiff's 
claim is to be characterised as an ‘equitable interest’ or an ‘equity’.157 
 
It is indeed true that the availability of bona fide purchase to those taking equitable interests 
remains contentious today.158 It is also true that the uncertainty surrounding Phillips is in no 
small part attributable to Lord Westbury’s use of infelicitous language; the term ‘equity’ has 
always served as an inexact signifier for a number of distinct rules, interests and claims.159 Even 
today, one can see instances of ‘equity’ being used interchangeably with ‘equitable interest’.160 
It must therefore remain true that the exact delineation between bona fide purchase and the 
equitable priority rules remains uncertain.   
 
A. Bona Fide Purchase and Equitable Priority: A Difference of Function 
 
Though we may concede the substance of the criticism above, we should make sure we fully 
understand what Lord Westbury was seeking to achieve by the distinction drawn between 
‘equities’ and interests. The purpose of this section of the paper is to look beyond the language 
used in Phillips toward the substance of its reasoning, which reveals an underlying, conceptual 
logic to the decision. In Phillips, Lord Westbury could not reject the defendants’ invocation of 
bona fide purchase simply by relying on the citation of authority because, as we saw above, 
this did not provide a reliable touchstone by which to distinguish the title-clearing defence from 
the equitable priority rules. For this reason, Lord Westbury sought to explain the distinction in 
conceptual terms; bona fide purchase served a different function from that served by the 
equitable priority rules. In theory at least, a court would be hard-pressed to confuse the two 
rules in light of these distinct functions, just so long as it kept the distinction in mind when 
assessing the claimant’s bill for relief. This is ultimately the approach Lord Westbury took in 
Phillips. 
What were these distinct functions? The function of bona fide purchase was to enable the 
defendant to keep a right or advantage in specie that the claimant was seeking to take from him 
or her.161 By contrast, the equitable priority rules dealt with a number of rights vested in a 
number of right-holders and sought to rank those rights in a notional queue. The place in the 
queue was determined by reference to two-factors: (i) the timing at which each right had vested 
in the right-holder; and (ii) the conduct of each right-holder.162 In short, had lawyers looked 
beyond the language used in Phillips toward this conceptual distinction, there would not 
necessarily have been the “difficult exercises in taxonomy” of the kind O’Sullivan rightly 
criticises.   
 
157 O’Sullivan, “The Rule in Phillips v Phillips”, 310. 
158 Bainbridge & Anor v Bainbridge [2016] EWHC 898 (Ch), [2016] W.L.T.R. 943, at [24]. 
159 Heydon et al., Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, 5th ed., [4–165]. 
160 Akers v Samba Financial Group [2017] UKSC 6, at [18] (Lord Mance).   
161 Ames, “Purchase for Value Without Notice”, 3; McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law, 187–88, 243–44. 
162 Rice v Rice (1853) 61 E.R. 646, 648 (Ch.). 
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The first task is to revisit the contemporary conceptual understanding of bona fide 
purchase in 1861. We shall then consider how Lord Westbury distinguished the title-clearing 
defence from the equitable priority rules in terms of their distinct functions. We will then relate 
this to Lord Westbury’s understanding of equitable rescission to demonstrate how the third 
category of bona fide purchase corresponded to this difference in function.   
 
B. Bona Fide Purchase in 1861 
 
We saw that the availability of bona fide purchase was a far greater source of uncertainty in 
the late nineteenth-century than it is today. The main reason for this confusion was that the 
defence operated at the interstices of several distinct bodies of rules: (i) those rules concerning 
the split-jurisdictions of the common law and Chancery courts;163 (ii) those rules concerning 
Chancery’s pleading system;164 and, of course (iii) the law of property, itself complicated by 
two nomenclatures of property right.165 It was therefore difficult to hone the defence down to a 
single, underlying rationale.166   
Despite this, a common theme underlay each of Lord Westbury’s categories of bona fide 
purchase in Phillips; namely, that the plea, when successfully raised, would render the court 
inert vis-à-vis the right or advantage the defendant had acquired as a good faith purchaser.167 
By 1861, there was already a long tradition in the case law that rationalised the plea in exactly 
these terms; a Court of equity would not take a right or advantage from a bona fide purchaser.168 
This is what was meant when it was said that, against equity’s darling, the court had ‘no 
jurisdiction’.169 It had no jurisdiction because a defendant who had given value in good faith 
had an equal claim upon the Court’s conscience as did the claimant.170 For this reason, the 
claimant had ‘no equity’, no claim to relief against the defendant.171 Yet jurisdiction was 
refused in pursuit of a functional end, that of allowing the defendant to keep a right or advantage 
free from adverse claims. Sir WM James L.J. neatly articulated this core function in 1874, a 
little over a year following Lord Westbury’s death: 
 
[I]t appears to me… a rule without exception, that from a purchaser for value 
without notice this Court takes away nothing which that purchaser has honestly 
acquired. If the purchaser has got possession of a piece of parchment, or of 
property, or of anything else which he thought he was getting honestly, this Court, 
in my opinion, has no right to interfere with him.172 
 
Of course, the breadth of Sir WM James L.J.’s formulation speaks to the fact that the defence, 
in terms of its core function, was strictly agnostic as to the kind of right the defendant had 
acquired; the necessity of acquiring a particular kind of right or advantage would be determined 
by the circumstances of the dispute, rather than by any kind of internal logic to the doctrine of 
bona fide purchase. So, in the context of an equitable priority dispute, the defendant would 
 
163 Wortley v Birkhead (1754) 28 E.R. 364, 366 (Ch.). 
164 Bassett v Nosworthy (1673) 23 E.R. 55, 56 (Ch.); Mitford, A Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of Chancery, 
5th ed., 228. 
165 Fox, “Purchase for Value Without Notice”, 65, 69–74; Langdell, A Summary of Equity Pleading, 2nd ed., 213. 
166 A Reilly, “Does ‘Equity’s Darling’ Need a Legal Title? Reassessing Pilcher v Rawlins” (2016) 10 J. Eq. 89, 108. 
167 Attorney-General v Wilkins (1853) 51 E.R. 1043, 1046 (Ch.); O’Sullivan, “The Rule in Phillips v Phillips”, 300. 
168 Bassett v Nosworthy (1673) 23 E.R. 55, 56 (Ch.); Brace v Duchess of Marlborough (1728) 24 E.R. 829, 831 (Ch.). 
169 Nair and Samet, “What Can ‘Equity’s Darling’ Tell Us about Equity?”, 281. 
170 Newton v Newton (1868–69) L.R. 4 Ch. App. 143, 145. 
171 Ind, Coope & Co v Emmerson (1887) 12 App. Cas. 300, 305 (H.L.) (Lord Selborne). 
172 Heath v Crealock (1874-75) L.R. 10 Ch. App. 22, 33 (C.A.). 
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need to take a legal estate in order to invoke the tabula in naufragio doctrine.173 By contrast, in 
equity’s auxiliary jurisdiction, the defendant could plead the defence even though he or she had 
failed to acquire any right at all;174 the mere “possession of a piece of parchment” would suffice 
given the practical advantage to the defendant born of the split-jurisdictions of law and equity. 
This ‘older’ conception of the defence is therefore alternative to the more modern 
formulation that limits the defence to the singular function of clearing legal titles of prior 
equitable interests in the context of a breach of trust.175 The structure of the judgment in Phillips 
makes clear why this represents a ‘modern’ formulation; in 1861 it was simply not possible, in 
light of the cases, to reduce the defence to a single fact-pattern in which a prior equitable 
interest faced a subsequent legal title. The modern, narrower conception of the defence was a 
later development, the description of which is beyond the scope of this paper.176 What is clear 
from an analysis of Phillips within its historical context is that, at the time it was authored, the 
third category of bona fide purchase represented just one instance of a more broadly conceived 
doctrine.177     
 
C. Phillips: A Priority Dispute 
 
In light of the analysis above, it is clear that bona fide purchase served a core function; it 
resolved a dispute in which both parties claimed a right or advantage in the defendant’s hands 
by rendering the court inert vis-à-vis the right or advantage the defendant had acquired as a 
good faith purchaser, thereby enabling the defendant to keep that right or advantage free from 
adverse claims.178 This kind of dispute was conceptually distinct from the one litigated in 
Phillips, in which the claimant and defendants were each asserting distinct equitable interests 
and the question was how those interests were to be ranked relative to one another. The 
hallmark of a priority dispute was therefore conceptual: it was a competition between two or 
more substantive equitable interests.179   
Viewed in this light, bona fide purchase simply could not perform its core function in 
Phillips and was not therefore available to plead. Two points make this clear. First, the claimant 
in Phillips was not seeking to take the defendants’ right away from them; he merely sought to 
vindicate his own prior equitable interest against the defendants’ distinct, subsequent interest.180 
The second issue concerned the nature of the right acquired by the defendants in Phillips. Lord 
Westbury’s essential riposte to the defendants was this: if the function of the defence is to 
enable a defendant to keep a right in specie, then it cannot save the defendant from any latent 
defects or disadvantageous features that are innate to that right. As Lord Westbury noted, the 
claimant’s equitable annuity had been ‘carved out’ of the equitable estate long before it had 
been transferred to the defendants; all they had acquired was a cake from which a slice had 
already been taken.181 As Lord Westbury observed: 
 
The case, therefore, that I have to decide is the ordinary case of a person claiming 
under an innocent equitable conveyance that interest which existed in the grantor 
 
173 “This is the meaning of the rule, that where a man has both law and equity on his side, he shall not be hurt in a Court of 
equity”: Willoughby v Willoughby (1756) 28 E.R. 571, 579 (Ch.). 
174 Wallwyn v Lee (1803) 32 E.R. 509, 512 (Ch.). 
175 Fox, “Purchase for Value Without Notice”, 75. 
176 For a brief overview of key developments, see: Reilly, “Does ‘Equity’s Darling’ Need a Legal Title?”, 108–09. 
177 Great Investments Ltd v Warner [2016] FCAFC 85, at [106]. 
178 Attorney-General v Wilkins (1853) 51 E.R. 1043, 1046 (Ch.). 
179 A distinction observed by Haynes, who served as counsel in Phillips: Haynes, Observations on the Defence of Purchase 
for Valuable Consideration Without Notice, 58–60, 63. 
180 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 E.R. 1164, 1166–67 (Ch.). 
181 Ibid., at 1168. 
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at the time when that conveyance was made… that interest was diminished by the 
estate that had been previously granted to the annuitant… there is no ground 
whatever for contending that the estate of the person taking under the subsequent 
marriage settlement is not to be treated by this Court, being an equitable estate, as 
subject to the antecedent annuity, just as effectually as if the annuity itself had been 
noticed and excepted out of the operation of the subsequent instrument. I have no 
difficulty, therefore, in holding that the plea of purchase for valuable consideration 
is upon principle not at all applicable to the case before me, even if I could take 
notice of it as having been rightly and regularly raised.182 
 
Lord Westbury is here explaining the functional disapplication of bona fide purchase in the 
context of a dispute between a number of distinct equitable proprietary rights. Such disputes 
were resolved using the equitable priority rules and this remains the case today.183  
 
D. Third Category of Bona Fide Purchase  
 
In light of this fundamental difference in function between bona fide purchase and the equitable 
priority rules, we can better understand Lord Westbury’s thinking behind the third category of 
bona fide purchase in Phillips. For two reasons, an ‘equity’ to rescind did not trigger the 
application of the ‘first in time’ priority rule but was instead subject to the title-clearing 
defence. 
First, the indications are that Lord Westbury viewed equitable rescission as a court-
administered remedy,184 and therefore saw the ‘equity’ to rescind as a procedural power to file 
a bill, commence suit and then seek the remedy of rescission.185 We might recall His Lordship’s 
description of the claimant in Eyre v Burmester as one who could “at any time during the life 
of Sadleir, by bill in equity have set aside the release, and obtained a reconveyance of the 
estate”.186 Insofar as an ‘equity’ was a procedural entitlement to commence suit, it could not 
‘register’ within the ‘first in time’ rule the function of which was to resolve disputes between 
vested equitable property rights.187 Though many scholars would today disagree with the 
characterisation of the mere equity as a procedural power, there nonetheless exists a consensus 
that, whatever its exact content, the ‘equity’ is not a vested equitable interest and does not 
therefore register within the equitable priority rules.188 
Second, a claim to rescind is, in substance, a claim to take a right away from the 
defendant, assuming that the defendant acquired a right from the original transferee under the 
voidable transaction. The rescinding-claimant is entitled to either a transfer of the same right 
in the hands of the third party purchaser, or the delivery-up and cancellation of that right.189 
This is a dispute in which bona fide purchase could discharge its core function, and so it should 
be resolved by reference to the defence. Indeed, it was an established rule at the time,190 which 
 
182 Ibid. 
183 Rice v Rice (1853) 61 E.R. 646, 648 (Ch.). 
184 O’Sullivan et al., The Law of Rescission, 2nd ed., [11.59]–[11.60], [11.82]–[11.92]. 
185 In Gresley v Mousley, decided just two years prior to Phillips in 1859, Lord Westbury appeared as counsel for the appellant, 
and argued that the ‘equity’ to rescind was not a devisable interest; the rescinding-claimant “was not owner of this estate, but 
had at most a mere right to set aside the conveyance”, which right “could not have been assigned, therefore it could not be 
devised”: Gresley v Mousley (1859) 45 E.R. 31, 33 (Ch.). 
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189 Heath v Crealock (1874-75) L.R. 10 Ch. App. 22, 25 (C.A.). 
190 Tennent v The City of Glasgow Bank and Liquidators (1879) 4 App. Cas. 615, 620–21 (H.L.). 
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has remained with us since,191 that rights acquired by innocent third parties, without notice of 
some prior fraud or other vitiating factor, may effectively ‘bar’ relief in specie by way of 
rescission,192 or rectification.193 Where an order of reconveyance would prejudice third party 
rights, equitable rescission shall not necessarily be barred, but relief shall be designed in such 
a way as to protect the third party purchaser.194 
In truth, the taxonomical distinction Lord Westbury drew between ‘equities’ and interests 
in Phillips was only a convenient shorthand to illustrate what His Lordship viewed as a 
difference in function between the title-clearing defence and the equitable priority rules. This 
distinction underpins the ratio in Phillips v Phillips. Whether or not the third category of bona 
fide purchase is worth keeping today is a broader question beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, in approaching that question, our focus should be upon the reasoning in Phillips 
rather than the language through which that reasoning was expressed. After all, Lord Westbury 
was only making use of terms that were commonplace in his own time and which we have not 




Legal history has a unique contribution to make towards giving us a deeper understanding of 
‘vestigial’ doctrines: those legal rules that were developed within the conceptual-framework of 
a prior age in response to its challenges, but which are now used to address our challenges.195 
This paper has sought to demonstrate this truism in relation to the rule in Phillips v Phillips. In 
that judgment, Lord Westbury said what he meant and meant what he said: the bona fide 
purchaser of an equitable interest takes free of prior ‘equities’. Behind this language lay a 
conceptual distinction of function between the bona fide purchase defence and the equitable 
priority rules. From today’s perspective, Phillips stands for a simple and commendable 
proposition: a Court of equity shall neither rescind nor rectify a voidable transaction to the 
prejudice of a bona fide purchaser, whether that purchaser acquired a legal title or an equitable 
interest.196 Until we change our minds about the good sense of this approach, Phillips shall 
remain integral, not only to our understanding of legal history, but also to our understanding of 
the rules we use today and the reasons why we use them. 
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